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This paper explores the collapse of the alliance between commercial farmers and 
the state in Zimbabwe. It argues that relations had deteriorated irrevocably by the 
late 1990s, precluding opportunities for compromise, and concludes that farmer 
opposition  to  the  constitutional  referendum  in  2000  was  symptomatic  of 
deteriorating relations, rather than the catalyst.  These assertions are based on 
interpretation  of  several  key  interacting  issues:  the  reconstitution  and 
politicisation of land demand within Zimbabwe’s deteriorating socio-economic 
climate;  the  internal  reconfiguration  of  the  ruling  party  under  pressure  from 
black empowerment interests and war veterans,;  the radicalisation of land policy 
through  ZANU  PF’s  aggressive  centralisation  of  the  land  issue  within  the 
political and economic crises; and finally, a limited awareness of these issues by 
commercial farmers, donors and the international community, and consequently 






                                                
1 This paper is drawn from Chapter Four of my doctoral thesis, which explored the relationship between commercial 
farmers and the state in Zimbabwe. See Selby (2006) Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics 
and land Reform in Zimbabwe, DPhil Thesis, Oxford.  










“I survive extremely well in a very hostile [race] environment… 
but without the hostility, I am not in business” 
 





“CFU is in a difficult position… As issues become more clouded it becomes 
increasingly arduous to see how to act in the best interests of the farmers”   
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1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Zimbabwe’s highly visible and often-violent crisis after 2000 tends to obscure the significant 
changes that took place during the late 1990s. The constitutional referendum of 2000 was an 
evident watershed, but it was set within a wider reconfiguration of the national political order 
and the changing realignments of key interest groups.  To set up my analysis of the alliance’s 
collapse, I discuss two processes.  Firstly, I examine how an active politicisation of the land issue 
by ZANU PF after 1995 allowed the ruling party to secure a monopoly over the moral issues and 
political capital of the land debate. Secondly, I explore how the radicalisation of the black 
economic empowerment lobby interacted with high-level corruption and the demands of war 
veterans, and how these together shifted the balance of power within the ruling party and the 
state.   The third part of the paper examines the impact of these realignments on the deteriorating 
relationship between commercial farmers and the state.  It illustrates the diminishing influence of 
white farmers, as well as other groups, in land and agricultural policy decisions.  I argue that 
reduced state support, increased taxation and a state-sponsored smear campaign marginalised 
white farmers politically, economically and socially and that this prompted farmers to exit from 
the alliance and support an emerging political opposition.  
 
1.2 ACTIVE POLITICIZATION OF THE LAND QUESTION  
 
Land in Zimbabwe has always been politicised, but after 1996 the nature of its political 
significance and utility changed.   Chapter Four of my thesis illustrated mounting incompatibility 
between populist-based ‘political’ arguments for radical reform, and technically-grounded 
‘economic’ arguments for moderate approaches (Selby 2006). This paper explores how radical 
sentiments overwhelmed judicious options.  Control of the land question and its political capital 
was monopolised by the ruling party. An objective of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act was to shift 
jurisdiction over property rights from the judiciary to the state executive in order to speed up 
land transfers. On Independence Day, in April 1993, Mugabe explained the need for the state to 
adjudicate the land process and emphasized the central role of the ruling party within the state.   
He reiterated this view when opening parliament in September 1994, repeating his intentions to 
resettle another five million hectares of land.
5  Moyo (1994: 4) saw this state empowerment as a 
positive step: 
 
                                                
5 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 28 September 1994: Lands and Legislation Report. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 4 
President Mugabe affirmed the central role that the state, as a sovereign entity, needed to 
play in land reform. (This) anchors the role of the state in adjudicating… the rights of the 
landowners…and also the land rights, needs and demands of the voiceless rural majority 
 
However calls for a strong state to lead and revitalize land redistribution ignored the ease with which 
other stakeholders could be excluded, and the negative implications of this. In short, those outside the 
patronage of ZANU PF were unlikely to benefit.  Increasing control of land by the ruling party contrasted 
with the recommendations of the Rukuni Commission (1994:140), the CFU and most donors, who called 
for adequate representation of all stakeholders. When Denis Norman was reappointed Minister of 
Agriculture in 1995, ‘land’ was separated once more into a Ministry of Lands and Water as it had been 
between 1980 and 1985.   Mugabe apparently joked with Norman that he did not trust him with the Lands 
portfolio because it was too important.
6    In 1996, the new Land Identification Committees, appointed by 
the ruling party and consisting of ZANU PF, government and AGRITEX officials, explicitly excluded 
commercial farmers.
7  David Hasluck (CFU Director) argues that the administration of the land issue 
changed dramatically during 1996, when Mugabe shifted control and responsibility from the Ministry of 
Lands and Water into the confines of ZANU PF’s central committee.
8  Mugabe used his 1996 Presidential 
election campaign to raise the political and racial elements of the land issue, to which most farmers 
responded by adopting low profiles. Hasluck was invited to a politburo meeting and asked why so few 
whites attended rallies.  He replied that “it is difficult to pluck up the courage to attend a mass rally if you 
were going to be castigated as a white racist that had frustrated government’s land program”.
9    
 
Initially, the CFU misjudged this politicization.  After attending a meeting of the ZANU PF 
Central Committee on 18 February 1996, David Hasluck reported back to council that “the land 
issue is politically sensitive and will always be canvassed, especially by the President, in any 
political campaign”.
10   When the anti-white rhetoric continued after the election, the CFU 
accepted the seriousness of the new direction but had no clear strategy.  In May 1996, Peter 
MacSporran noted that “the political situation had deteriorated from bad to worse” and that 
“farmers are in for a difficult time”.
11  His suggestion was to “lobby and improve the PR status 
of the Union with the general public”, in the hope that public awareness would mediate and 
moderate the land agenda.  Rob Webb (President ZTA) wanted “more macro political and 
economic debate”, to generate “better farmer awareness of bigger issues”. Hasluck explained the 
                                                
6 Interview with Denis Norman, Sussex, October 2004. CFU minutes noted that “this (Ministry) was split due to the 
political requirement for the redistribution of resources”. Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 26 April 1995. 
7 The Farmer, 6 June 1996: 10.  
8 Interview with David Hasluck, Nyanga, March 2003.  He also stressed this to CFU Council.  Minutes of the CFU 
President’s Council Meeting, 29 January 1997. 
9 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 March 1996. 
10 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 March 1996. 
11 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 29 May 1996. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 5 
difficulties of distinguishing between election hype, empowerment rhetoric and genuine 
policies.
12  Mr Taylor, from the Matabeleland branch, felt that “more attendance at political 
events was needed”.
13  Such vague proposals illustrated the CFU’s awareness of the problems, 
but their diminishing ability to respond to them.  
 
Within government, moderate officials realized that the issue was moving beyond their control, 
but also failed to offer practical alternatives.  Dr Kangai explained that there were a variety of 
strong ‘political’ views within the government and within the party and that opinions were 
hardening.
14  He claimed to have repeatedly defended the CFU’s position in cabinet, but was 
increasingly frustrated by the ‘token compromises’ of white farmers.   Kangai described the 
farming sector as a lion that had eaten and eaten but refused to let anyone else near the prize.   In 
August 1996, his critical address to the CFU Congress was interpreted as “dictatorial”.
15  He 
“told the farmers to come up with offers of land…or else we will be forced to resort to 
identifying it ourselves”.
16 Several Ministers, who had accepted invitations to the Congress, 
failed to show up, suggesting that the range of stances within the ruling party and the 
government were aligning against the perceived intransigence of the CFU.
17   
 
The CFU continued to direct Kangai towards the land market, towards extensive areas of 
unsettled state land, and towards underutilised parastatal land, particularly that belonging to the 
Agricultural Research Development Authority (ARDA).
18   Most CFU leaders felt that there was 
hypocrisy in identifying productive white-owned land when government farms were under-
utilised, and often recognised to be so by government officials.
19 Robbie Mupawose 
acknowledged that there was need to reform the state sector but that the CFU presented the issue 
in a condescending manner that implied government and general black incompetence.
20  The 
Farmer subsequently discussed the designation of a working 6000 ha ranch adjoining Nuanetsi 
Ranch.
21   Nuanetsi, measuring 300 000 hectares, was owned by the Development Trust of 
                                                
12 Interview with David Hasluck, Nyanga, March 2003.  
13 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 24 April 1996.  
14 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 30 June 1993; Interview with Dr Kumbira Kangai, Harare, Dec 2003.  
15 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 25 September 1996. 
16 Interview with Malcolm Vowels (CFU regional representative), Concession, September 2000. 
17 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 25 September 1996. 
18 In 1997, CFU Minutes record that there were many empty farms between Odzi and Save, and also in Shamva 
north but that most of these farms were owned by blacks and therefore outside the scope of the exercise. Minutes of 
the CFU Council Meeting, 29 January 1997. 
19 Interview with Nick Swanepoel, Chinoyi, January 2005.  The Rukuni Report (1994) cited parastatal farms as a 
key sector for review. Roth (1994: 29) noted that ARDA losses had increased during the 1980s to more than US 
$2.5 million per annum by 1989, and that only five percent of their land area was cropped. 
20 Interview with Dr Robbie Mupawose, Harare, January 2004. 
21 The Farmer, 6 June 1996: 9. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 6 
Zimbabwe (DTZ) and, according to the article, remained “virtually derelict”.
22   In much the 
same way that Mangwende’s procurement of a prime farm had created international uproar, so 
such stark inconsistencies in land designation angered farmers, donors and other critics. 
 
Most farmers attributed the stagnation in land transfers to government shortfalls in funding 
allocations and broader resettlement capacity. The CFU identified nineteen different ministries 
involved in land settlement in 1996, compared to sixteen in the mid-1980s and eleven in the 
early 1980s.
23  Waning government credibility among farming leaders suffered a further setback 
when Nick Swanepoel (CFU Vice President) claimed that he had inside knowledge from 
contacts in Makonde that prime land would be allocated to senior officials.
24    By 1996 the race 
issue was at the heart of this land politicisation process and fed into the empowerment agenda. 
As the state assumed control of ‘land’, and the ruling party increased control of the state, so an 
alliance of empowerment interests increased its influence within the party. At ZANU PF’s 1996 
congress in Bulawayo, CFU sources warned that 2028 farms had been identified for compulsory 
acquisition, and that a “young radical empowerment group had led the agenda”.
25    In November 
1997, 1471 farms were listed for compulsory acquisition.  However, most identified properties 
did not match the ‘Kangai principles’ (Moyo, 2000).    When the CFU asked for clarification, Dr 
Kangai claimed that “other criteria” had been used in the selection process, including “political 
reasons”.
26    In 1993, Dr Kangai had conceded that ‘political reasons’ were used in the 
identification of Altena farm in Centenary.
27 He explained that this was ‘symbolic’ because it 
was the first farm attacked during the war - he went on to assure the CFU that such designations 
would be isolated.  By 1998, his acknowledgement of the use of “social and political reasons” as 
core elements of the 1997 identifications, demonstrated how the politicisation of land had 
become a dominant feature of the process by the end of 1997.
28   Within this, the logic of simply 
securing land from whites began to override rational approaches. 
 
                                                
22 The DTZ was initially established by ZAPU and chaired by Joshua Nkomo. 
23 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 27 November 1996. 
24 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 29 January 1997: Security Report.  Swanepoel was renowned 
for contacts within the ruling party. This information was offered in confidence to CFU Council. 
25 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 29 January 1997. 
26 Interview with Dr Kumbirai Kangai, Harare, December 2003.  Dr Kangai claimed that he would have preferred a 
more consensual approach, but was under pressure from the politburo. Minutes of the CFU President’s Council 
Meeting, 29 October 1997. 
27 See Appendix 4.3.  Discussions with Chris Pohl, (Previous owner of Altena Farm), Harare, January 2004. 
28 “Minister Warns Racist Zim Farmers”, Dispatch Online (SA),  6 February 1998. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 7 
1.2.1  Legal Contests and the judicial cul de sac  
 
Some members of the ruling party viewed the preparedness of ‘white farmers’ to legally 
challenge farm designations as confrontational.  By exposing technical and legal shortfalls in 
government’s reform program white farmers were seen to belittle the social and political 
significance of the land issue.  The legal system’s exposure of the program shortfalls was also 
interpreted as a hostile gesture, rather than as an inherent flaw of the program, even when listed 
farms clearly violated identification criteria.  Joseph Msika subsequently claimed that farmers 
were responsible for the politicization of the land issue because they took government to court.
29  
My analysis suggests that Msika’s observations were retrospective, and that politicisation of the 
land issue conveniently provided a means of circumventing legal procedures. 
 
Since the early 1990s, influential elements of the ruling party perceived the law to be more of an 
obstacle than a vehicle for achieving land redistribution.  In 1991, during and after the 
emergency farmers’ meeting, Witness Mangwende asked white farmers not to seek legal 
recourse, admitting that government was wary of the courts.
30   During a heated meeting shortly 
afterwards, Patrick Chinamasa (Attorney General) warned David Hasluck that if the farmers 
resorted to legal proceedings, the government would simply change the constitution.
31   Simon K 
Moyo declared in Parliament in 1992 that “the land issue is a political issue … it is not an issue 
for the judiciary!”
32 Following opposition to the initial land listings in 1993, Mugabe declared 
that he would “brook no decisions from any court that rules against government policy” and that 
if the law did not suit the modalities of land then they would simply change the law.
33   
 
Both parties were aware of two things: firstly, that the legislation of the 1992 Land Acquisition 
Act (LAA) was weak and, secondly, that it could be changed.   By agreeing to the Kangai 
principles an uneasy truce ensued.  However, every batch of farms designated for compulsory 
acquisition since 1993 included properties that violated the agreed identification criteria.  This 
was indirectly acknowledged by government when most of the 1994 listings were revoked. 
Likewise most of the 1471 farms gazetted in 1997 were ‘delisted’.   Of the 1993 listings, four 
farmers contested their cases legally.  Two key cases, including those brought by Henry 
                                                
29 Discussions with Vice-President Joseph Msika, Harare, November 2002. 
30 Although farmers were in strong legal position to oppose designation, the CFU were warned by their lawyers to 
use legal recourse as a last resort. Interview with Richard Wood (Atherstone and Cook) Harare, January 2004. 
31 Interview with David Hasluck, Nyanga, March 2003. 
32 Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 17 March 1992. 
33 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 29 September 1993: L&L 19684. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 8 
Elsworth and Alistair Davies, illustrated the time and cost concerns of legal recourse.
34  By the 
end of the following year, Alistair Davies’ case was still being remanded.  According to CFU 
records it was unlikely to succeed but government did not want to lose it, so kept deferring.
35  
Hereford Farm’s case had also been protracted and although the Minister lost the case in the 
administrative court, the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), on ‘political’ directives, tried 
to seize farm equipment.
36   Max Rosenfels, from Matabeleland, had a farm identified for 
acquisition in 1996, which he conceded the following year, but had still not been compensated 
for two years later.
37 It is also important to contextualise the number of legal challenges. 
Approximately 200 farms were listed between the 1992 LAA and the 1997 listings, of which 
about 100 were de-listed. Less than ten were legally contested. The rest were conceded. 
 
When the 1997 mass listing of 1471 farms took place, Alex Masterson, the CFU legal 
representative, wrote to the government asking for a clear position on the land program.
38  Early 
in 1998 Masterson warned CFU Council against using court action before negotiation.
39 Hasluck 
feared that it would sour relations and could set a negative legal precedent.  In response to 
member concerns, the Agricultural Promotion Trust was established as a central fund from 
which members could draw to fight designation independently.
40  Approximately 1200 appeals 
were lodged after the 1997 listings, resulting in renewed anti-white rhetoric at the beginning of 
1998, in which the normally amenable Minister Kangai threatened to designate the farms of “all 
racists and critics of government” – he did not elaborate on what specific criteria identified or 
distinguished these groups.
41  Mugabe again warned that the land issue was ‘political’ and would 
not be derailed by the courts.  By actively politicizing the land issue through rhetoric, through 
selective portrayals of the land issue, and through populist justifications, the government sought 
to circumvent or even override its own legal framework.  
 
                                                
34 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 23 February 1994. Davies had been Vice-President of the CFU in the 
1980s.  His tobacco farm in Centenary was highly developed and did not meet any of the Kangai Principles. 
35 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 September 1995 and Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 
29 May 1996. The latter set of minutes record that the hearing was due on 30 May 1996. 
36 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 23 February 1994. 
37 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 27 May 1999. 
38 Interview with Richard Wood (Atherstone and Cook) Harare, January 2004. Minutes of the CFU President’s 
Council Meeting, 26 November 1997. 
39 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 25 February 1998. Richard Wood, of Atherstone and Cook had 
issued similar advice.  Interview with Richard Wood, Harare, January 2004. 
40 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 26 November 1997.  A call to members for a $1000 donation 
each was well supported. A special levy was subsequently added to CFU membership fees to fund land 
contestations: Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 27 May 1999. 
41 “Minister Warns Racist Zim Farmers”, Dispatch Online (SA),  6 February 1998. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 9 
1.2.2  The Waning Influence of the Technocrats 
 
The ruling party’s active politicization of land was reflected in the waning influence of more 
moderate individuals and government departments.  This was well illustrated in the land tenure 
debate.   Parliamentary discussions during the drafting of the 1992 LAA led Mugabe to appoint a 
Land Tenure Commission (LTC).   Popularly known as the Rukuni Commission (1994), it was a 
comprehensive study of Zimbabwe’s land and agricultural structure.  Most key stakeholders 
were represented to some extent, with strong input from small-scale farming groups and rural 
communities.
42 The report offered a clear set of recommendations for each farming sector. The 
key recommendations were to retain but decentralize communal tenure in communal areas, to 
allocate longer-term leases in purchase and resettlement areas with a view to granting private 
tenure, and to retain freehold tenure in commercial areas (Rukuni 1994: 49, 69, 83 and 99).   It 
emphasized dire pressure on land within communal areas, but also noted the differentiated nature 
of the commercial farming sector and the varied concentration of skills, productivity and 
employment within it.  Most significantly the Report recommended the appointment of an 
Independent board to adjudicate land redistribution.   The recommendations were supported by 
the CFU, the ICFU, the ZFU, the World Bank and the British Government.  Whilst government 
agreed with the commission in principle, it was ignored in practice - a poignant illustration of 
how moderates and technocrats within the government and the agricultural sector were being 
sidelined.  Indirectly, government’s stance also amounted to a dismissal of key donor groups. 
 
Shortly after the Rukuni Report was published, Dr Kangai reassured Denis Norman that short-
term resettlement would proceed on land that had already been acquired (approximately 200 000 
hectares at that time), and that medium term reform would follow the recommendations of the 
report.  Towards the end of 1995, on ZBC’s Sunday evening Insight Program, Dr Kangai stated 
that the Land Tenure Commission’s recommendations would be incorporated into an all-
encompassing land act that would establish concepts of maximum farm size, land taxes and a 
principle of one man - one farm.
43  Professor Rukuni has subsequently expressed frustration at 
the lack of response to the commission, citing ‘politicians’ and the ‘waning influence of 
technocrats’.
44  Dr Kangai lamented the fact that the recommendations were not implemented, 
                                                
42 Four of the twelve commissioners were traditional leaders and four were representatives of different farming 
groups.  The last four included two academics and two prominent members of the agricultural industry. 
43 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 September 1995. 
44 Interview with Professor Mandivamba Rukuni, Harare, February 2004. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 10 
and cited “a range of political views within the party”.
45  He also explained that the resistance of 
white farmers undermined the credibility of moderate politicians within the politburo:  
 
They were simply against any type of land redistribution.   Why did they go to court, why 
did they oppose things like the land tax?  Why did they not offer land?  This allowed 
impatient members of the party to say to me ‘look, see …your route is not working … 
these whites are just opposed to everything, even when you try to include them’.
46   
 
Dr Mupawose argued that polarizing perspectives between CFU and the government undermined 
the recommendations of the Rukuni Commission, and their chances of implementation.
47 As the 
issue dragged on, moderate stances within government were increasingly seen to be part of the 
reason for the stagnation in land redistribution, and so calls for more fundamental measures from 
the hard-line elements within ZANU PF gathered momentum. 
 
1.2.3  Racialisation of the Land Question 
 
Race has always been a central aspect of the land question, but was actively promoted and 
distorted within the politicisation process. The more land was politicised, the more race formed 
the overriding principle and the more sustained and concerted anti-white rhetoric became.  Anti-
white sentiment had simmered throughout the 1980s and 1990s. CFU records during the 1980s 
contained sporadic references to anti-white propaganda, and elements of the 1992 LAA debate 
sometimes moved towards race.
48 However, after 1995, the state media’s derogatory portrayal of 
whites increased drastically.
49   During 1996, Roger Boka’s empowerment campaign in the 
public media was more centred on denigrating whites than empowering blacks. It was effective 
and contagious.  ‘White farmers’ and their ‘racist ways’ were portrayed as the core problem 
within the land deadlock, even among intellectuals.  For example, Moyo (1994: 8) linked farmer 
resistance to racism: 
 
White farmers believe that they, not the state, should decide on land designation… 
(but)such decision making powers in designating land undermines the legitimacy of 
                                                
45 Interview with Dr Kumbirai Kangai, Harare, December 2003. 
46 Professor Sam Moyo also argued that farmer and donor intransigence allowed the ‘radical wing’ of ZANU PF to 
gain ascendancy.  Interview with Professor Sam Moyo, Harare, January 2004. 
47 Interview with Dr Robbie Mupawose, Harare, January 2004. 
48 For example, see Simon K Moyo’s speech in Hansard Record of Parliamentary Debate, 17 March 1992.  
49 See Appendix VI. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 11 
the elected government in adjudicating the land problem…it is a pretence that land 
grievances do not exist or are irrelevant in implementing land designations.  Most 
interestingly it demonstrates an arrogance that only makes sense in racial parlance. 
 
The white community’s visible affluence and continued social isolation, which amplified during 
structural adjustment, provided a target and a catalyst for anti-white sentiment. An independent 
consultant identified the racial exclusiveness of the CFU as their biggest weakness and greatest 
threat.
50  Racism among some whites was still prevalent and mounting scepticism among farmers 
towards government was often explained through condescending cultural perspectives. Some 
farmers maintained conservative attitudes with racial undertones.  For example, a CFU report 
from 1995 records that “Mr de Klerk suggested that the use of rubber bullets when dealing with 
poachers and stock thieves was a good idea”.
51   However, other farmers, particularly the younger 
generation, were more enlightened and socially proactive.
52   Von Blackenburg (1992 and 1994) 
identified increased co-operation between white farmers and black farmers in communal areas 
during the 1992 drought. He discussed changing attitudes among whites, particularly towards 
social responsibilities and suggested that two-thirds of white farmers felt they were socially 
accepted by black Zimbabweans.
53  Most of his respondents acknowledged that they needed to 
integrate more and were willing to do so, but that it was often difficult to know how.  Similar 
patterns of social isolation exist among the settler societies of Argentina and Australia, and in the 
established farming cultures of the United States and Europe.  Unsociable work patterns, 
geographical isolation, social norms and cultural peculiarities detach commercial farming groups. 
The nature of this isolation in Zimbabwe was reinforced through the organisational structures of 
the communities and their institutions, including security networks, co-operative buying pools 
and country clubs.  However for many blacks these arrangements were insignificant and 
irrelevant to the overriding and enduring divisions between black and white. The combination of 
race and affluence was particularly unpalatable, leaving white farmers with few sympathizers 
among the wider population.  ZANU PF actively expanded its intelligence network in the 
farming areas during this period and gathered information on farmers and the farming 
community. Every farm had informers, as did key gathering points such as country clubs.
54 
                                                
50 During the early 1990s the CFU employed an independent consultant, Professor Michael Bratton, to conduct a 
study into the CFU’s political and structural weaknesses and threats. A copy of the report is in the CFU archives. 
51 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 28 June 1995. 
52 Weiss (1994) distinguished between ‘Rhodies’ and Zimbabweans and also noted the generational differences. 
53 Compared to 1970, when less than 40 percent of white farmers had been born inside the country, more than 80 
percent of remaining whites had been born inside the country by 2000 (Brand, 1981: 38; CSO, 2003).      
54 In the case study area it subsequently turned out that the barman at the Concession club and the barman at the 
Barwick club were ZANU PF officials.  Many farmer respondents described the astounding levels of information 
that local Party authorities, such as DAs, seemed to have on individual farmers, their families and their backgrounds QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 12 
 
In March 1996 there was protracted discussion among farmers about whether ZTA and CFU 
should react to racist statements by Roger Boka, or to the racist rhetoric in the press.
55  Both 
councils decided against a countering media strategy, as “the press was unlikely to be 
sympathetic to farmers”.
56  The Farmer commented on the state media’s hostility towards whites: 
 
Zimbabwe is now a land where the trumpets of hatred … threaten to drown the voices 
of reason…A land where ‘indigenous’ means blacks only… a land tacking perilously 
close to the official appellation pariah state.
57 
 
The press campaign targeted individual farmers, sometimes accurately, but usually not.  CFU 
minutes recorded racially sensitive incidents in their PR section, and during this period they 
steadily increase. There was a notable shift in official attitudes and policies towards farmer 
behaviour. Many incidents were exaggerated, distorted or misrepresented. Mugabe publicly 
declared that “notorious and racist farmers will be targeted first”.
58  Most state coverage focused 
on allegations of racist attitudes, arrogance, a lack of concern for farm workers, and financial 
greed. Roger Boka and Philip Chiyangwa admitted that there was a concerted and systematic 
campaign to discredit white farmers.
59  A CFU Security Report reads:   
 
there is regrettably a growing tendency on the part of the authorities to regard offences 
committed against the commercial farming sector with some degree of laxity, whilst 
offences committed by members of the commercial farming sector are regarded with a 
considerable degree of severity.
60 
 
The following year Nick Swanepoel (CFU President) urged farmers to tread carefully, stressing 
that “a single wrong action or comment by a single farmer could jeopardise the whole group”.
61   
This was a tense period for white farmers, notable for the absence of reassurances from those 
officials previously perceived to be moderate. Even Dr Kangai declared to parliament in 1998 
that ‘racist farmers’ would be targeted in land identifications.
62  
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1.2.4  The Deterioration of British-Zimbabwe Relations  
 
Politicization provided a medium of unity among many pro-land redistribution interests, but the 
rhetoric of race and revolution isolated other important groups.  ZIANA reported in 1996 that 
“racial and inflammatory remarks by Zimbabwean government officials and radical black 
pressure groups against whites are reportedly discouraging major western business persons from 
investing in the country”.
63  This isolation spread into diplomatic circles and a long history of 
Imperial distrust between Harare and Britain (Lee 2003).  For members of the ruling party, 
scepticism of British strategic policies dated back to UDI.  Stoneman and Cliffe (1989: 29) argue 
that the British remained largely passive about Rhodesia for the first ten years of UDI.  Although 
relations improved after 1980, distrust re-emerged in the incomplete reconciliation of the 1980s 
(Raftopolous et al 2004). Accusations of a British plot to perpetuate the Lancaster House 
constitution through funding conditions, were prevalent in Government rhetoric and cited as a 
reason for the subsequent slow-down in the land transfer process, although Margaret Thatcher 
reaffirmed support for a market based reform program (Palmer, 1990:163).  In 1991, a Times 
(London) editorial stated that there was “no point in paying good British money to support a 
catastrophically bad resettlement policy”.
64 After the 1992 LAA, diplomatic relations 
deteriorated further. In 1993, the British informed the CFU that they would not support a 
compulsory reform process.
65   Moyo (1994: 8) argues that farmer lobbying against the LAA 
created donor flight, but Britain had remained steadfastly opposed to compulsory acquisition.
66 
In a meeting with CFU officials on 23 January 1996, Dr Kangai admitted that government did 
not have the funds for resettlement.
67  Mugabe used his 1996 election campaign to press Britain 
on funding obligations. According to CFU records: 
 
the main thrust of the sentiments expressed [during the campaign rallies] were that if the 
British government are not prepared to make any more money available for land 
acquisition there would be a taking of the land… and that an accelerated program to 
finalise the land issue would be in place and implemented during the next 5 years.
68 
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CFU minutes continue:  “the fact remains that there is still ample land available for government 
needs for resettlement but very little money for land acquisition”.
69   In June 1996, Baroness 
Chalker promised support, but reiterated Britain’s insistence on the willing-buyer willing-seller 
format.   Mugabe was adamant that if British funding was not forthcoming, he would take land 
and not pay for it.  The CFU subsequently tried to organize a meeting with the ZFU, the British 
delegation and the government, noting that Kangai appeared willing, but Mugabe reluctant.
70 
The meeting did not materialise, but in October an ODA (1996) report on land reform proposals 
confirmed that Britain was firmly in support of a willing-buyer willing-seller concept, but not 
compulsory acquisition.
71 Kangai refused to comment specifically on the report but warned that 
government would proceed with extensive reform if necessary.
72   
 
Mugabe set the British government a July 1997 deadline to resume funding for land (ICG 2004: 
54).   In the meantime, whilst the government stressed its funding limitations, the War Victims’ 
Fund scandal emerged (see below), in which approximately US$100m was looted by senior 
officials, and about US$200 million was pledged in gratuities to placate the real war veterans.  
This amounted to nearly twice the total funding spent on land acquisitions since 1980, but 
Mugabe ignored this incongruity and simply stepped up his self-righteous calls for British 
funding.
73  In early November 1997, he restated that his government would only pay for 
‘improvements’, not for the land, and that Britain would have to look after the white farmers. 
Clare Short, the Development Secretary, responded to Minister Kangai on 5 November 1997: 
 
I should make it quite clear that Britain does not accept that it has a special responsibility 
to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe.  We are a new government with diverse 
backgrounds without links to former colonial interests.  My own origins are Irish and as 
you know we were colonized not colonizers. We do however recognize the very real 
issues that you face over land reform… we would be prepared to support a program of 
land reform that was part of a poverty eradication strategy but not on any other basis.
74 
 
Many analysts identify Clare Short’s letter as a key moment in the frosting of relations between 
Harare and London (Chan 2002). Dr Kangai described it as “incredibly insensitive… (with) a 
                                                
69 Minutes of the CFU Council Meeting, 27 March 1996. 
70 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 26 June 1996. 
71 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 26 March 1997. 
72 Minutes of the CFU President’s Council Meeting, 27 November 1996. 
73 Financial Gazette, 5 November 1997. 
74 Copy of the Letter from Clare Short to Minister of Agriculture and Land, Hon K. Kangai, 5 November 1997. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 15 
complete lack of understanding, or respect, for the Zimbabwean administration”.
75  Denis 
Norman, who had severe reservations about the direction of the land program at that stage, 
described the letter as “tactless”, and John Laurie was equally critical of Short.
76  The letter was 
instrumental in aligning the moderate camps within ZANU PF with the more radical groups, and     
Mugabe immediately ordered the designation of 1471 farms (4 million hectares) for compulsory 
acquisition on 11 November 1997 (ICG, 2004: 54).
77  Blair subsequently wrote to Mugabe in 
more diplomatic fashion the following year, but later advised that he would be sending the High 
Commissioner to the 1998 Donor’s conference, rather than attending personally. By the time the 
British government had back-pedalled it was too late; the utility of the diplomatic rift to the 
Mugabe regime had become clear, and has since been used to maximum advantage.  It allowed 
Mugabe to portray the land deadlock as part of a bilateral disagreement within a wider set of 
historical grievances.
78  It also allowed him to corral the various camps within ZANU PF. 
 
British support for land transfer has been disappointing, particularly in view of pledges before 
and during Lancaster House, and the precedent of Kenyan land buyouts. Lord Carrington, who 
chaired Lancaster House, recently acknowledged British responsibilities, but stopped short of 
admitting that he had given full funding assurances in 1980.
79 Commercial farmers appear to 
have been largely irrelevant in this rift. The CFU could possibly have played a more proactive 
stance in lobbying British financial support, rather than fuelling donor scepticism, but farmer 
doubts over British integrity dated back to UDI.  In any event this is unlikely to have shifted the 
direction or momentum of the issue, as Britain remained firmly opposed to a buy-out. 
 
1.3 THE RADICALISATION OF BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT (BEE) 
 
The formal black empowerment agenda of the early 1990s made little impact on the slow pace of 
reform in white-controlled sectors, especially banking, mining and farming.   Glaring disparities 
in resource access continued: in 1980 there were 7000 dams in ‘white’ areas, irrigating 100 000 
hectares, whereas there were only 5000 hectares of irrigated land in small-scale farming areas 
(Stoneman, 1981: 139).  By 1994 there were 15000 dams in commercial farming districts 
irrigating nearly 400 000 hectares compared to only about 50 000 hectares in communal areas 
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(Rukuni 1994).  Structural adjustment benefited established white-controlled sectors and hit poor 
black sectors hardest.  Eighty percent of officially marketed output was still produced by 
commercial farmers in 1994 and much of the fertile, better-situated and capitalised land was still 
owned by large-scale farmers. Figure 1.1 illustrates the proportional control of land in agro-
ecological regions, and commercial farmers’ continued dominance in regions I and II. 
 









(AREAS IN COMPARATIVE SCALE) 
Source: Rukuni (1994: 13) 
 
Widening disparities of wealth between the most visible white sectors and the majority of blacks 
fuelled the appeal and impatience of more vigorous economic empowerment, particularly among 
the black elite.  The Independent described “a growing restlessness among the majority of people 
who still feel economically marginalized in their own land”.
80    In 1994, the Affirmative Action 
Group (AAG) split from the IBDC, under the chairmanship of Philip Chiyangwa, a young 
relative of Mugabe’s.
81   The AAG illustrated three features of affirmative action and the 
direction it was to follow: growing impatience, close ties to the ruling party, and its use to further 
personal agendas (Raftopolous and Moyo, 1995).  
 
Also at the heart of the AAG was Roger Boka, who leapt to prominence as a champion of black 
empowerment. Boka’s demands for access to the gold, finance and tobacco sectors became 
symbolic of calls for wider ‘economic nationalism’, and attracted support from black business 
and broader society.   The aggressive nature of Boka’s campaign moved quickly towards a 
sponsored smear-campaign against white sectors.  In 1996 he had bragged, "I survive extremely 
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well in a very hostile [race] environment…but without the hostility, I am not in business”.
82  On 
31 March 1996, he published a full-page advertisement in several national newspapers, 
reproducing an old photograph of a black Kenyan carrying a white man across a swollen river.   
The caption read: “White Zimbabweans'  idea of a ‘good African’," adding: "We want our 
country Zimbabwe and our economy. No dogs or guns will stop the people' s revolution". CFU 
responded by accusing Roger Boka of “stirring racial hatred to his advantage” and council 
minutes note “rumours that the ZTA president’s life was threatened by Boka”.
83   This was a 
very different format to the empowerment policies of the early 1990s.  Boka’s approach was 
arrogant and ruthless, but it was popular, particularly within the ruling party, and he secured 
significant government support, symbolically and materially for his bold ventures into tobacco, 
banking and mining. 
 
1.3.1  The Indigenous Commercial Farmer’s Union (ICFU) 
 
As the momentum of black empowerment gathered pace so it turned attention directly towards 
white farming.  By 1995 most black commercial farmers still felt marginalised within the CFU, 
which to all intents and purposes remained an ‘all-white old boys’ network’.
84  The same social 
and representative barriers to black integration from the 1980s persisted. Keith Harvey explained 
to the CFU council that many black farmers felt socially awkward at country clubs, and were 
often ostracized by the cliques that formed at club bars after farmers meetings.
85  By 1996 not a 
single black member had been elected to the CFU council.  The Indigenous Commercial Farmers 
Union (ICFU), informally established in 1990, had initially been ignored and then denounced by 
government but re-emerged in 1995 with significant support.
86   The new launch was organised 
by empowerment groups, with extensive coverage by the state media.
87   ICFU membership 
initially drew from about 800 small-scale farmers, from former purchase areas, and from about 
400 large-scale black commercial farmers (Moyo,1994: 4).
88  Government’s stance towards the 
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ICFU had shifted strategically.  If CFU power could not be diluted through a single union, then 
an alternative strategy was to establish a parallel structure.
89 
  
Boka’s aggressive empowerment strategy was appealing and increasingly adopted by politicians. 
Vice President Muzenda, addressing members of the Save Conservancy in 1996, stated that “this 
form of land use will not succeed unless indigenous businessmen are brought in as partners”.  He 
then gave the Wildlife Conservancies two weeks to come up with concrete suggestions.
90 Boka’s 
foray into the banking sector enjoyed similar support from government, operating outside 
standard banking regulations with the blessing of the political elite.
91   Unlike South African 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) charters there were no formalised guidelines, targets, 
incentives or controls in Zimbabwe’s format - just conveniently vague objectives.  Indigenisation 
was officially aimed at expanding black shares in the economy, but as it radicalised, it became 
more about promoting ruling party interests and those of key members. 
 
1.3.2  The Selectiveness of Empowerment  
 
ZANU PF increasingly used the empowerment process to extend its patronage.  Key individuals 
dominated the process and its organizational structure for personal enrichment and in return 
stayed close to the ruling party.  Boka and Chiyangwa’s influence at ruling party congresses 
increased steadily, bolstered by other black businessmen.
92  It was a flexible process in which 
young black entrepreneurs were absorbed or persuaded into the ruling party in return for 
preferential business opportunities.  Chiyangwa explained the nature of this arrangement: "I am 
rich because I belong to Zanu PF. If you want to be rich like me you must join the ruling 
party".
93  Established members of the ruling party used their positions to secure contracts, 
licenses and access to other commercial opportunities. Within this process the opportunities for 
corruption increased.  For example, Leo Mugabe, the President’s nephew, won a series of 
controversial tenders between 1994 and 1997, including a contract to build the Harare airport.
94   
The award of a Hwange power station contract to a Malaysian firm under controversial 
circumstances illustrated significant irregularities at high levels. 
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It was also an exclusionist system in which black entrepreneurs and businessmen, who were 
unwilling to tow the party line, met obstacles. Most prominently, Strive Masiyiwa, a dynamic 
telecommunications entrepreneur, battled for five years to obtain a licence to open a cell phone 
company.
95  When a cartel of competitors, including Leo Mugabe, acquired a similar licence 
within months, the case became a focal point for protest against high-level corruption. It also 
sparked divisions within the party:  Joshua Nkomo threatened to resign over the issue and 
Eddison Zvobgo was overtly supportive of Masiyiwa. Taylor (1999: 258) wrote that: 
 
Zimbabwe’s most ‘successful’ black business people are thus notable for their close ties 
to the state…and whose rise from ashes to riches is most suspicious…Since they are 
already co-opted into the state network they pose no political threat to the government… 
in fact they will likely be the heirs of the ZANU PF political machine. 
 
The subsequent liquidation of Boka’s United Merchant Bank (UMB) in 1998 revealed further 
corruption at high levels.
96 In return for preferential banking conditions, UMB had been used as 
a vehicle for extending loans to high-ranking party officials.
97  Many outstanding debtors were 
members of the ZANU PF hierarchy, including Chiyangwa and, allegedly, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa.
98 Corruption was seemingly overlooked providing it was within the party structure.   
This tainting image of the empowerment movement drew criticism from a wide array of civic 
groups, observers and commentators.  Taylor (1999:260) argued that: 
 
ZANU PF’s principal tool for maintaining political power is the ideology of 
‘indigenisation’ which is currently practiced in Zimbabwe as a neo-patrimonial game 
that rewards inefficiency and depresses productivity.  Corruption becomes more likely 
in the absence of political and economic competition; ZANU’s monopoly on power 
allows it to act with virtual impunity. 
 
Dwindling state revenues were countered with bolder policies.  The National Social Security 
Authority (NSSA) tax was implemented as a pension scheme for the workforce in 1994, but was 
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channelled to central treasury, whilst the 1996 Tobacco Levy was also channelled to central 
funds (See below).
99   ZANU PF’s business interests expanded significantly during this period.  
Empowerment had become more about bolstering the ruling party’s financial resources, and 
those of its supporters, than about wider black empowerment.
100  CFU records show that such 
issues were discussed at council level, and often in depth.   While noting international concerns 
about budget discipline, governance transparency, land and corruption, they also discussed 
focused cases such the President’s wife “coming under fire for the misappropriation of USAID 
money for residential developments”.
101  White farmers and many others increasingly attributed 
the mounting political and economic crisis to deteriorating governance.  Diverging objectives 
over the direction of empowerment led to a breakdown in 1996 of the Zimbabwe Wealth 
Creation and Empowerment Council (ZWCEC), an official umbrella body.
102  Ominously, this 
split within the empowerment alliance resulted in a radical AAG offensive led by Chiyangwa 
and Boka in alliance with Chenjerai Hunzvi of the War Veterans’ Association.      
 
1.3.3  Empowerment, War Veterans and the State 
 
1996 was a turbulent year for commercial farming, particularly the tobacco sector, and yet it 
delivered the highest economic growth of the 1990s.   The politicization of the land issue during 
the election campaign and ZANU PF congress was highly visible and aggressive empowerment 
rhetoric dominated the media.  However, behind the scenes other developments were taking 
place which must be contextualised briefly.  A rigorous study of Zimbabwe’s spread of ‘top-
down’ corruption has yet to be conducted, but is needed to improve understandings of the state 
before and after the war veterans scandal emerged in 1997.
103 
  
A 1993 War Veterans Compensation Act included a War Victims Fund, aimed at disability 
compensation for ex-combatants. In 1996 this fund was systematically ‘looted’ within eight 
months as senior government officials and members of the ruling elite claimed extensive 
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disabilities.
104 Margaret Dongo, an Independent MP, ex-combatant and founder of the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) observed in Parliament: 
 
There are so many cabinet members, civil servants, army officers and police officers who are 
claiming funds for serious disabilities that it is a wonder the government can function at all… 
Most of the real war veterans are living in abject poverty… this is Zimbabwe’s worst scandal.
105 
 
The ZNLWVA subsequently assumed an anti-government stance, drowning out Mugabe’s 
speech at Heroes Acre in Harare and disrupting Heroes Day commemorations in Marondera, 
where they told Governor Karimanzira that “government will not be allowed to honour dead 
heroes whilst we the living heroes suffer”.
106 The protests led to a demonstration outside State 
House where veterans threatened to return to war if demands for pensions and land were not 
met.
107  Mugabe responded by promising that 1772 farms, which had apparently been identified, 
would be reallocated with priority to war veterans.
 108 In October, Vice-President Muzenda 
confirmed that ex-combatants would be the first beneficiaries of land.
109  
 
Mugabe’s decision to award gratuity payments to war veterans was taken independently of 
parliament, and transformed the issue from a severe embarrassment to a useful alliance. He 
portrayed his stance as reasserting the ideals of the revolution and refusing to abandon his kith 
and kin.   The unbudgeted payments comprised of a Z$50000 ‘one-off’ gratuity, and a monthly 
pension of Z$2 000 per veteran. About 50 000 people were finally approved for benefit.  The 
initial bill to treasury was estimated at Z$ 2.5 billion (US$208 million) followed by monthly 
payouts of Z$ 100 million (US$ 8.3 million).
110  The gratuity alone exceeded total expenditure 
on land since Independence.
111  This pattern of events was even more remarkable in that 
Chenjerai Hunzvi (ZNLWVA Chairman) masterminded the disability scam. He was exposed by 
the 1997 Chidyausiku Commission, but only after he had brokered the gratuities.
112  Rather than 
holding Hunzvi accountable, the war veterans threw support behind his promise to secure land. 
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This marked the emergence of a new set of actors in the political dynamic.  The war veterans 
aligned with the empowerment lobby in its quest for key resources. Denis Norman argues that 
this was the pivotal and defining moment in the crisis.
113 It coincided with the listing of the 1471 
farms on 11 November, stimulating significant short term economic impacts. On 14 November 
1997 the Zimbabwe dollar lost more than half its value.  To meet the payouts, government 
hastily announced broad tax increases which were rejected in Parliament and led to violent street 
protests.
114   At the 1997 ZANU PF congress, war veterans and empowerment leaders dominated 
proceedings.  This consolidated their influence within the party and swung the balance of power 
away from the technocrats firmly towards the radical alliances. The following year, when Dr 
Kangai de-listed 500 farms from the main list, he was strongly criticized from within the party, 
particularly by Hunzvi.
115  For ZANU PF, the war veterans were a valuable constituency, 
symbolically and strategically.  This new found influence reshaped the politics of the land 
deadlock and accelerated the deteriorating relationship betweens farmers and the state. 
 
1.4  THE COLLAPSE OF THE STATE- FARMER ALLIANCE 
 
By the end of 1997 the ruling party, the government and the state had experienced profound 
changes, against which the commercial farmers were unable to adapt. CFU minutes in September 
1997 note that “the PR situation is very difficult”, and that “farmers are the focus of a lot of bad 
press, particularly with respect to farm-worker conditions and the land issue”.
116  The minutes 
note concern at wider political developments and the recent capitulation to the war veterans. A 
month later council concluded that commercial farmers were “under fire from all directions”, 
that their lobbying was ineffective and that their views were increasingly irrelevant to major 
decisions. In response members resolved to ‘internationalise’ the issue in the hope that external 
awareness would arbitrate the process.
117 To explore the ‘cornered’ position in which the farmers 
now saw themselves it is appropriate to discuss the introduction of a levy on tobacco production.   
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1.4.2  The 1996 Tobacco Levy  
 
In the 1990s tobacco was sold in nominal US dollar values but payments were made to farmers 
in Zimbabwe dollars, allowing government to extract revenues and control the sector through the 
exchange rate.  Tobacco output and earnings increased throughout the 1990s (See Figure 1.2).
118   
The 1996 Tobacco levy illustrated two important issues: firstly, the irrelevance of farmer 
lobbying to agricultural policy and, secondly, that despite the levy, tobacco earnings and output 
continued to increase contrary to ZTA’s pessimistic predictions.   
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The 1996 Tobacco Levy was introduced by Treasury rather than the Ministry of Agriculture, 
following a politburo directive.
119  ZTA called an emergency meeting, in much the same manner 
as CFU did in 1991, arguing that the tax should be levied at the buyers, away from the producer, 
and that five percent on income was excessive, especially for small farmers.
120 The five percent 
tax was on gross turnover and not tax-deductible, so growers would be liable for income tax on 
the levy amount too.
121   Part of their press statement reads:   
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The ZTA and its growers are incensed at the imposition of the new five percent levy which 
(we) see as iniquitous and discriminatory… tax on exports is totally contrary to ESAP… (we 
have) moved from a nine percent export incentive to an eight percent export disincentive.
122 
 
The ZTA’s response was reactive and defensive.  Calls for a ‘tractor demonstration’ in Unity 
square were diffused by the CFU council, in more sober fashion, but other tobacco growers 
threatened to cut down on worker housing.
123 The bill had notable precedents in 1949 and 1958, 
but whereas farmer opposition succeeded then, it failed now. Indeed, the ineffectualness of 
farmer opposition in 1996 was a stark realisation of how irrelevant farmers had become.  
 
Denis Norman (Minister of Agriculture) was on holiday when treasury introduced the bill and it 
was ‘fast-tracked’ by Parliament within 21 days.
124 The Farmer had described the passage of the 
1992 LAA as “rushed and hushed”, and now noted an “atmosphere of haste and secrecy 
surrounding the proposed tobacco levy”.
125 Opposition was not exclusively white. The initial 
draft was blocked in parliament by Webster Shamu and Border Gezi, both MPs for small-scale 
tobacco growing areas. At the secondary hearing, five out of six ZANU PF MPs debated against 
it.
126  The ZFU opposed the tax and Dr Kangai suggested that he would rather tax the buyers, 
which CFU argued would simply be passed down to the growers.  
  
Despite concerted efforts, concerned ZTA officials were unable to meet Mugabe, in the same 
manner as Laurie’s restricted access after the 1985 election and Swire-Thompson’s after the 
1993 ‘Paris Conference’ letter.
127  The ZTA turned on Denis Norman, complaining that the levy 
had been passed despite his assurances of a compromise.
128  In May government increased the 
levy to ten percent, split equally between the trade and the farmers. TRIBAC attempted to block 
it and failed, illustrating the surprisingly limited influence of the tobacco companies as well.
129 
Peter Richards (ZTA President) ruefully declared that “the imposition of the additional five 
percent …levied against the growers is nothing but petty spite coming from MPs who do not 
understand economic fundamentals”.
130  In response Herbert Murerwa (Finance Minister) tried 
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to backdate the levy to the beginning of the selling season.
131 In June, the ZTA warned of the 
impacts of the levy in a series of public advertisements, which catapulted the issue into the 
empowerment debate. The AAG declared that the ZTA was “thwarting indigenization” and 
accused Denis Norman of racism and the tobacco merchants of double invoicing.
132   The more 
ZTA lobbied traditional channels the less success it had and the further it found itself from the 
negotiating table.  As the ZTA’s powerlessness sunk in so frustrations were directed inwards. 
Richard Tate (ZTA Vice President) again criticized Denis Norman’s ‘apathy’ over the matter.
133 
When Kangai advised the ZTA to stop opposing the levy, Tate again castigated Norman for 
inaction.
134   
 
Early in 1997, Dr Kangai introduced a broader set of agricultural marketing levies, again as a 
result of ruling-party directives.
135 Again, Denis Norman was on leave.
136   Realising that the 
odds were firmly stacked against the farmers, Norman, on return, sought compromise rather than 
confrontation. He lobbied extensively throughout January and February for the agricultural 
marketing levies to be hypothecated back into a separate agriculture/land fund rather than central 
treasury, and claims that assurances were given.
137 In May 1997 it was revealed that the 
agricultural levies were being channelled into the central tax account.
138    $52 million (US$4 
million) was raised between January and March, and CFU noted that “it was clear by now that 
high level decisions were being made and implemented completely independently of (the 
farmers)”.
139   
 
CFU minutes note that “ZTA were still publicly undermining Denis Norman”, illustrating how 
oblivious the ZTA council were to Norman’s irrelevance within the process. 
140  Norman retired 
at the end of April 1997, claiming that he had pencilled the date in his diary when he accepted 
the appointment two years previously.
141  In an interview with The Farmer, he stated “when the 
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party’s all over it’s time to go home”, citing age as his main reason.
142 Mugabe apparently tried 
to persuade him otherwise, arguing that “politicians never retire”.
143 Three months previously, 
Norman had talked of ultimate job satisfaction in public service, without mentioning retirement. 
The previous year he stated that he would remain in the portfolio as long as he was asked to.
144   
He denied that political pressure was involved, but after a turbulent year, in which he was 
heavily criticized by the tobacco farmers and empowerment groups, and humiliatingly sidelined 
from major decision-making, the difficulties of his predicament were obvious.  
 
The levies also created institutional splits.  In January 1997, the ZTA supposedly relinquished all 
‘land initiatives’ to the CFU.
145  However the ZTA soon reverted to independent lobbying, and 
tried to hold a seminar with Parliament, who declined en masse.
146   Swanepoel expressed 
concern that a ZTA land position paper had been leaked to government: 
 
[Swanepoel] had always been under the impression this report was an in-house 
one… it had been agreed by ZTA and CFU that the CFU drove the land issue, 
and yet it had not had any input into the report under discussion.” 
147   
 
Richard Tate argued that government had asked for a copy of ZTA’s technical report on land and 
soils, and that “the report was not a recommendation, but rather a thought-process that farmers 
must go through in the same way as government”. Swanepoel then voiced concern at the 
antagonism between the CFU and the ZTA that had arisen in some farmers’ meetings, and felt 
that “during times of pressure there was a lot of responsibility to behave as leaders”.
148 Yet the 
contentions and controversies over the tobacco levy and ZTA’s autonomy continued.
149 
 
The tobacco levy also created structural divisions, particularly between owners and managers. 
Some farmers simply passed the tax onto their managers and workforces, by reducing bonuses.  
Other farmers cut down on social expenditure such as worker amenities.
150   Manager’s bonuses 
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in good years had often enabled them to raise enough collateral to farm independently, and had 
become an accepted part of the system.  The Farmer’s letter page traced a public rift between 
some owners and managers.
151  Farm owners accused the Blackfordby Tobacco Training 
Institute of inflating the self-perceived worth of graduates, and of distorting the concept of 
bonuses into rights rather than privileges.  Managers argued that their bonus cuts did not stop the 
excessive spending of owners. One letter castigates a farmer’s wife for buying a new set of 
curtains every year, whilst another complains that a tobacco farmer cut his manager’s bonus after 
the levy and then purchased a new hot tub.
152    
 
The agricultural levies were a divisive issue in a divisive period, and captured the cocktail of 
interests and strategies among different groups.  The AAG launched an offensive against the 
white Minister of Agriculture, the tobacco merchants and the ZTA.   ZTA was concurrently 
criticising Norman whilst trying to align with Roger Boka.  The CFU was concerned at the 
ZTA’s independent lobbying and its own restructuring.   But within this confusion, the 
agricultural levies illustrated three important points: firstly, the exclusion of commercial farmers 
from policy decisions, secondly, the shift towards new taxes on commercial farming, and thirdly, 
that the revenues were not being directed towards land reform or agriculture. 
 
1.4.3  The Ineffectiveness of Farmer Initiatives 
 
The political clout of white farmers waned during the 1990s.  Farming leaders from this period 
are often accused of lacking the political acumen of their predecessors, but their challenges were 
greater and their room for diplomatic manoeuvres was more limited. Commercial farmers’ 
attitudes towards land redistribution were often portrayed as reactive. Moyo (1994: 7) argued that  
 
the white community itself has… not made concrete offers of land for redistribution, 
demonstrating a wait and see approach and defending their rights to hold large tracts of land… 
there has been little proactive action by the white landowners and their representative (CFU). 
 
Whilst mounting scepticism towards the formal land program grew, many farmers were 
pragmatic enough to realise that promoting reform would protect their interests in the long run. 
Commercial farmers set up, supported and helped to run settlement schemes locally, such as the 
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Percival farm scheme in Macheke, Wenimbi scheme near Marondera and the Angwa scheme in 
Makonde.   A national level scheme was established through the Farm Development Trust.   
Initiated in 1992 by the ZTA, and formally opened in 1994, the FDT was run by a representative 
board, appointed from the agricultural industry and its unions, and reported directly to the 
Ministry of Lands and Agriculture.
153   The trust established projects at Panorama farm in 
Centenary and Bratton Farm in Matepatepa.  It then assumed administration of Percival and Lot 
10 Wenimbi, where local farmers had been helping fourteen resettlement farmers.
154   By the end 
of 1995 the FDT had expanded to about 300 hectares under tobacco on four projects, in which 
more than 150 farmers had benefited.
155   The program was beginning to attract donor attention 
and funding, and its PR success was recognised when Mugabe officially toured the Centenary 
FDT projects in 1996 and commented favourably. 
156  By the end of 1997, six schemes were 
promoting nearly 250 black farmers.    However, the scheme was far from self-funding, and in 
the context of the national land problem it was tiny.  The financial expenditure illustrated the 
high costs of undertaking carefully managed and monitored resettlement, and raised fears about 
the costs of extensive resettlement.   Alan Ravenscroft, a founder of the trust, remarked that:  
 
the scheme had lots of positive aspects, but there is simply no way that it could be 
replicated on a national scale - the costs of this exercise showed how expensive a 
managed resettlement scheme was likely to be.
157    
 
The FDT also suffered political interference initially. Gerry Grant reported that the settler 
selection for Panorama farm in Centenary had met with extreme resistance from local politicians, 
who wanted to run it themselves and it was only the presence of high profile board members that 
overcame these.
158    Other farmer initiatives, including support for communal farmers with land 
preparation, inputs and management advice bolstered white farmer perceptions of their own pro-
activity. However, these initiatives were not substitutes for land reform, and illustrated how 
irrelevant local relations could be at national level.
159  Dr Robbie Mupawose suggested that the 
elements of farmer pro-activity were overshadowed by the negative elements, perceived and real, 
of social isolation, enduring racism and wealth.   As the politicisation of land increased so farmer 
initiatives were treated more suspiciously. 
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1.4.4  The Deteriorating Institutional Effectiveness of the CFU 
 
The weakening political effectiveness of the CFU and the ZTA created internal pressures. 
Initially these were due to the changing profile of the sector. The establishment of the 
Horticultural Producers Council (HPC) as a commodity board in 1990 reflected the growing 
significance of the fresh exports and horticultural sector.
160  By 1995 the HPC was powerful 
enough to ask for autonomy from the CFU, prompting extensive council debate.  Peter 
MacSporran advised against this in view of “the need for unity within the deteriorating political 
situation”.
161 David Hasluck opposed the de-merger on the basis that the CFU had financed the 
HPC for five years and expected some loyalty.  
 
In 1995 the recommendations of the Meikle Commission led to a restructuring of the CFU. 
Regional and Commodity councils were established with the idea of concentrating grass-roots 
and technical debate at Regional and Commodity levels, allowing more strategic decision-
making within a smaller, but more powerful, President’s council.
162 Functional limitations soon 
emerged and previous CFU leaders queried the wisdom and the effectiveness of the 
restructuring.
163  There were also concerns among members.  By the end of 1997 the ZFU had 
attracted 100 white members from the CFU, whilst about 200 had joined the ICFU.
164    
Matabeleland members had been unhappy with the CFU’s 1991 strategy and were equally 
unimpressed with the 1996 congress, arguing that council consistently placed the interests of 
Mashonaland first and that their representation was diminished within the new structure.
165 
 
The CFU’s awkward relationship with the tobacco sector simmered throughout the 1990s.
166     
The ZTA was a more united, streamlined, and economically powerful body.   However, the 
limitations of its power were exposed during the deliberations over the 1996 Tobacco Levy.
167    
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Later, in October 1999, CFU minutes note that ZTA had met Mugabe independently and that 
Richard Tate appeared to be pursuing his own land route.
168 On 26 October 1999 Tim Henwood 
received a call from the President’s Office “accusing the CFU of no longer being supportive of 
government”.  According to the informant, a ZTA employee had leaked CFU information to 
government. Denis Norman claims that he was deliberately set up by ZTA leaders during the 
agricultural levy campaign and that he had proven this through the use of private investigators.
169   
In 1997, David Hasluck expressed the challenges of remaining institutionally united during times 
of uncertainty:  “CFU is in a difficult position – As issues become more clouded it becomes 
increasingly arduous to see how to act in the best interests of the farmers as a whole”.
170  
 
Other divisions between farmers emerged at grass roots.  During the 1996 Presidential election 
campaign, some Centenary farmers donated maize to ZANU PF. This elicited favourable 
comments from the party towards the donors, but prompted harsh criticism against those farmers 
that did not contribute.
171  The non-contributors then argued that the maize donors had placed 
them in an awkward position and community rifts ensued.   In Shamva, the ‘water wars’ which 
had emerged in the early 1990s continued.
172 The case study area, upstream, experienced similar 
resource battles.
173   Towards the end of 1996 the President’s Council registered concern that 
CFU Councillors at local and district levels were undermining central council.
174   Following the 
1997 farm listings, attendees at a Glendale farmers meeting strongly criticised the CFU.
175  The 
following month CFU Council cited Mashonaland Central as a “major problem”: individual 
farmers had tried to negotiate their way off the list through the Governor, Border Gezi, who was 
deleting and adding farms without Senior Minister Msika’s approval.  Nick Swanepoel was 
furious with these farmers, arguing that it was prompting splits within the community; even a 
farmers’ association chairman was implicated.
176 By 1998 The Farmer magazine was regularly 
criticizing internal CFU politics and in response the council turned on the “unconstructive 
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criticism” of the editor.
177  When Bob Swift was asked to resign from the CFU Presidency later 
in the year, council blamed The Farmer for a breakdown of confidentiality.
178  
 
Swift’s forced resignation after only four months in office illustrated how the pressures of the 
time infiltrated the CFU hierarchy. Following the 1998 Donor Conference, Swift travelled to 
Brazil with a governmental delegation to assess a market-based land reform program, and whilst 
absent an internal coup was mounted against him.
179  At an extraordinary meeting on his return, 
David Hasluck, called for Swift to delegate the land issue to Nick Swanepoel, who had agreed to 
stay on as a land representative to use his rapport with the donors, members of government and 
the ruling party.
180  Swift claims that Hasluck and a core group in council conspired against 
him.
181 Hasluck claimed that Swift was regarded with suspicion within the ruling party and that 
he had “failed to do what his members had tasked him to do”.
182  Swanepoel was asked to 
reinstate himself for the remainder of the year, and received a standing ovation when he 
agreed.
183  Denis Norman was shocked at the manner in which the CFU had conducted the affair, 
observing that it demonstrated disunity and disloyalty.
184   
 
1.4.5  The 1998 Donors Conference 
 
The breakdown of the 1998 Donors conference agreement is often cited by CFU representatives 
as evidence of ZANU PF’s insincerity. Populist pressures, funding conditions, and internal 
disagreements within government hamstrung the initiative before it started.
185  An analysis of the 
conference and its aftermath illustrates the breakdown in communications between farmers and 
the state, and the ascendancy of the new and more radical alliances within the ruling party.   
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At the 1997 ZANU PF congress members accused farmers and donors of demanding excessive 
control over the land program.   The IMF, WB, EU and other donors stated that they would only 
support legal, transparent and consultative land redistribution.
186     Early in 1998, a joint 
initiative between CFU and government land technocrats formed ‘Team Zimbabwe’ to keep the 
donors and the government at the negotiating table.
187   Together they drafted a paper entitled 
“Agriculture in Zimbabwe: Lets Grow Together” with a land transfer proposal based on market 
reform (CFU, 1998).
188 The CFU identified 78 farms available for immediate resettlement and a 
series of discussions followed.
189    On 27 February 1998 an open seminar on land was held at 
the Meikles Hotel. Hasluck noted that since compulsory acquisition had been introduced in 1992, 
much less land had been acquired than ever before.  He argued that the land act and funding 
shortages had stifled transfers, and that the market system still offered the best way forward.
190   
CFU records suggest that Team Zimbabwe was dismissed by ZANU PF as a delaying tactic, but 
that the proposals had not been attacked by “important” ministers or MPs.
191 Swanepoel 
arranged to meet Nkomo and General Mujuru, with Kangai and Msika.
192    This illustrated a 
more sophisticated lobbying strategy that took account of internal differences within the ruling 
party.
    Mugabe stated he would wait and see what the farmers and the donors could come up 
with.  On 9 March, a closed meeting was held between government, CFU and the banking sector. 
At a press conference afterwards Minister Kangai declared that no land would be confiscated 
without adequate compensation and that redistributions would be transparent.
193   
 
However, differences of opinion within government soon re-emerged.  In May 1998, Dr Hungwe 
(Director of Lands) wanted to acquire the farms that had not been delisted.  Dr Kangai opposed 
this as he did not want to disrupt the Donors Conference, but stressed to the CFU that the 78 
farms offered should be purchased before the ZANU PF congress in December.
194 He warned 
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that there were “strong radical pressures within the party to ignore the donors and go it alone”.
195 
There was also pressure on the ground and farm invasions erupted in May 1998 (Moyo, 2000b).  
In Nyamandlovu, about 800 ‘squatters’ moved onto three properties.  According to CFU minutes 
they were well organized.
196 In June, several farms in Marondera were occupied.
197 By 
September, Team Zimbabwe had identified 118 available farms, amounting to 113 000 hectares, 
mostly in Region II. Mugabe was apparently pleased and reassured Swanepoel that he wanted 
the land program carried out in a disciplined manner.
198 He then reemphasized intentions to settle 
110 000 families on five million hectares at an estimated cost of US$1.9 billion, most of which 
he expected to come from donors (ICG 2004: 61). The disparities in perceptions about how the 
program would proceed were stark. Nevertheless, key members of Team Zimbabwe were 
confident that funding would materialise and that the program would proceed.
199    
 
Twenty donor countries were represented alongside the WB, UNDP, IMF and EU. Government 
sent moderate delegates - the technocrats and diplomats; and whilst debate within the conference 
was constructive, less than $US1 million of guaranteed funding materialised, most of which was 
from Zimbabwean financial institutions.
200  The Farmer noted that larger donors promised 
support on condition of a “calm, orderly, fair and transparent program”. Unprecedented donor 
caution had recently been fuelled by the collapse of Boka’s Bank, government’s involvement in 
the war in the Congo, and the increasing lack of transparency in the land program.
201   
 
1.4.6  The Inception Phase Framework Plan (IPFP) 
 
Government signed a memorandum of understanding at the Donor conference, agreeing to an 
Inception Phase Framework Plan, in which the 118 available farms would be purchased, resettled 
and monitored. After the conference, Denis Norman met with Mugabe, who expressed support 
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for the IPFP.
202  However donor groups had apparently registered concerns about “increasing 
government covertness” over the issue.
203   CFU sources warned that the politburo perceived the 
price of land to be too high and the IPFP too restrictive and too conditional.
204  After the 1998 
ZANU PF congress, compulsory acquisition notices were issued to 841 farms, violating the 
signed communiqué from the conference.
205   The CFU noted that government had only settled 
four farms that year, despite purchasing 40 of the 118 that had been conceded.  Against these 
figures they queried how government “could possibly justify [listing] 840?”. Jerry Grant (CFU 
Deputy Director) explained to CFU council that there were two simultaneous agendas running 
concurrently within government:  a moderate co-operative approach from the donor conference, 
and an irrational radical program driven by a volatile group with strong influence within the 
politburo.
206  Although the CFU had previously identified the existence of two ‘camps’ within 
the ruling party this was the first formal acknowledgement of dominance by the radical group. 
Patrick Chinamasa, the Attorney General, had apparently advised cabinet to proceed with the 
mass designations or lose credibility with the war veterans, party members and the rural 
population, who were all expecting more fundamental reform.
 207  Hasluck felt that government 
seemed unaware of the enormity of the impact on investor confidence, on borrowing abilities and 
on practical farming operations.  The CFU, on the other hand, were unaware of just how little 
most members of government cared about this by now. Shortly after the donor conference, 
Joseph Msika told the CFU that government wanted to defer compensation for land as there were 
more pressing issues such as financing the military in the Congo, and paying out the war 
veterans.
208  Mugabe then declared: “we’ve decoded that the process of price negotiation can 
take place after the people have been settled.”
209  
 
Communications between the CFU and the government deteriorated publicly. At a joint press 
conference with Olivia Muchena (Deputy Minister of Agriculture) Swanepoel and Hasluck 
expressed surprise at the mass listing of farms in contravention of the IPFP.  Muchena was 
unable to offer an explanation and later accused Hasluck and Swanepoel of embarrassing her in 
front of the cameras.  Hasluck claimed that “donors were furious at the new government angle” 
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and that the head of the World Bank mission to Zimbabwe was “horrified by the change of 
direction”.
210  He also claimed that Government now realised that donor support had closed 
unless there was formal return to the IPFP agenda.
211  
 
Government was obviously still concerned about donor opinion as there was a concerted effort to 
reengage.  Muchena publicly reaffirmed that it was government’s intention to stick to the 
IPFP.
212  General Zvinavashe, the Head of the Defence Forces, issued a statement calling for the 
principles of the donor conference to be followed and for compensation to be paid to the farmers. 
In February both Vice President Msika and Dr Kangai told press conferences that the program 
would remain transparent.
213  However, immediately afterwards, Mugabe accused Britain of 
treachery, stating that he refused to pay for the land and that government bonds would be issued 
for improvements.   Divided opinions between compromising camps in government and radical 
alliances within ZANU PF explain these oscillations between conciliation and confrontation, 
although both groups had vested interests in seeing donor funds materialise. These contradictions 
kept the donors engaged, but off-guard, and increasingly cynical. Only the World Bank and 
IFAD had prepared program reports by 1999. DFID recommended donor reconsiderations, 
stressing the potentially high cost of inaction.
214  World Bank representatives reached a similar 
conclusion: “the risks of doing nothing exceed those of a failed attempt” (ICG, 2004).     
 
Swanepoel stressed the need for the CFU to remain apolitical and observed that as the 
government grew less consultative, the stances of the donors and the CFU were converging, and 
that the government was isolating itself.
215  Early in January, Swanepoel met Silas Hungwe and 
Emmerson Zhou from the ZFU, to lobby support for the IPFP and to push government to acquire 
the remainder of the 118 available farms by April.
216   Government’s first draft of the IPFP 
insisted on a target of 5 million hectares.   The costs of the inception phase framework budget 
were estimated at about Z$167million (US $ 10m) and technical support at about Z$40 million 
(US$2million).     In May, the World Bank agreed to release a US$5 million learning and 
innovation loan, with a further US$5 million on completion of the initial phase.
217  By the end of 
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May about 40 of the remaining farms, measuring nearly 50 000 hectares, were bought at a cost of 
about US $ 2.5 million, at prices that the owners were satisfied with.
218   
 
Whilst government’s delays in producing the IPFP blueprint were due to disagreements about its 
scale and direction, funding and implementation delays were influenced by other factors.  In 
early 1999, the IMF registered concern about Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC, and the lack 
of commitment to macro-financial discipline.
219  In February and again in July, Herbert 
Murerwa, the Minister of Finance, tried to reassure the IMF: 
the government publicly reaffirm(s) its intention to pursue the land reform strategy set 
out at the donors'  conference in September 1998. The two-year inception phase of this 
strategy was endorsed by cabinet in April. The strategy will involve fully transparent 
procedures governing the acquisition and redistribution of land, the payment of fair 
compensation for land acquired, and immediate commencement of the inception phase 
that will focus on the resettlement of uncontested farms...  Implementation of land reform 
will be undertaken in close consultation with stakeholders and beneficiaries.
220 
The letter also claimed that the costs of the war in the DRC were about US$1million per month. 
It worked: in August the IMF released a $193 million loan (ICG, 2004: 67).  Michael Nowak, the 
assistant director for Africa, said that “land was ‘no longer an issue’…and that… Mugabe’s 
rhetoric did not worry the fund, which preferred to judge ‘what is happening on the ground’.” No 
mention was made of the DRC, despite a leaked government memo suggesting that real costs 
were closer to US$1million per day and that US$166 million had been spent in the Congo in the 
previous six months, roughly the same amount that had been spent on land purchases since 1980.  
The Financial Times issued a scathing response, arguing that Mugabe had: 
 
received a bail out he does not deserve, on terms he is unlikely to implement, 
offered by lenders who ought to know better.  It does a disservice to Zimbabwe and 
makes the Fund look foolish. 
221  
 
                                                
218 See ICG (2004: 67). This works out at an average price of US$50 per hectare, which is similar in real terms to the 
average price of land purchased during the 1980s.   A University of Wisconsin project illustrated that the land 
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The FAO and UNDP funded a workshop which led to a Ministry of Lands and Agriculture draft 
National Land Policy Paper, that again recommended land taxes and subdivision, transparency 
and consultation. It was the same territory that had been explored at every conference and 
workshop since 1995.  The ICG report (2004: 68) claims that the “technocrats were sidelined by 
the radical elements” but this had happened much earlier as illustrated in the ZANU PF 
congresses of 1996 and 1997.  By 1999 the technocrats, the donors and the farmers were all on 
the same side but it was too late.  No one was prepared to inject funds into the deteriorating 
political mix, and the longer the deadlock ensued the more the political situation deteriorated. 
Towards the end of 1999, David Hasluck and Nick Swanepoel attended the opening of the 
ZANU PF party congress and reported heated debate noting that “the leadership was castigated 
by war veterans and younger businessmen party members”.  Hasluck and Swanepoel were then 
asked to leave.
222  The CFU had been aware of these ‘two camps’ within the ruling party for 
years, and noted the growing power of the radical alliance, but underestimated the significance 
of it, convinced that ‘sanity’ would prevail.   In January 2000, DFID announced that it was 
planning to allocate U.S. $8.2 million for resettlement projects through a Civil Society Challenge 
Fund.
223   Stan Mudenge (Foreign Minister) later argued that this illustrated how the British 
government was trying to force Mugabe to hold elections without letting him have the funds to 
fulfil his promises on land, thus undermining his popular support.
224   While DFID’s funding 
delays made little difference materially, Britain’s stance was undoubtedly linked to the broader 
political contest, which, by now, was dominating the strategies of most interest groups. 
  
1.4.7  White Farmer Mobilisation and the Constitutional Referendum 
 
CFU records from February 1998 record growing frustration among farmers over political 
uncertainties and the stalemate over land.
225  Although the CFU tried to depoliticize its congress, 
members were increasingly tempted to mobilise against government, even within Council.
226 In 
November the CFU noted that despite the obviousness of the crisis “the bankers and business 
community in Harare [were] doing absolutely nothing”.
227 But while urban capital remained 
aloof, farmer disgruntlement joined popular discontent among ordinary Zimbabweans.   
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By 1999, farming members felt that the CFU “was not being proactive enough and should 
engage with the international community, the black middle classes and the ZCTU after the recent 
strikes”.
228  White political remobilization was a response to deliberate exclusion and direct 
threats to their interests and security. The economic crisis was spiralling out of control, as 
illustrated in Fig 1.3, and for many members of the white community the time to press for an 
alternative government was overdue. 
 











The drafting of a new national constitution began through an alliance of civil society and church 
groups formally organised under an umbrella National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).
229 
Government responded by appointing a National Constitutional Commission (NCC) whose 
drafting of a new constitution began consultatively enough.  The draft constitution became a 
focal point for political contest as the NCA shifted its role to critique the NCC’s draft.  This 
increased political awareness and activity nationally. For commercial farmers the constitutional 
review began inclusively. Nick Swanepoel (CFU) and Richard Tate (ZTA) were both appointed 
commissioners for the NCC and the CFU was asked to submit suggestions.  CFU minutes note 
that key issues under consideration included: governance, accountability, the Bill of rights clause 
and its influence on land, and judicial independence.
230  By October, CFU minutes note that the 
government and party drafts were quite pragmatic, but that two controversial clauses, relating to 
Mugabe’s extended powers and compulsory land acquisition without compensation “raised much 
concern… were self-defeating in many respects, and were likely to scare away donors”.
231 
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Commissioners were not consulted on amendments to the draft which retained the controversial 
clauses over property rights and presidential powers.   By the end of January the amended draft 
was being discussed extensively in CFU council. Mugabe’s calls for Britain to assume full 
responsibility for land compensation prompted council to note that “Government were now 
refuting the donor conference agreements” and the CFU “feared that if the referendum was 
agreed, the donors would run”.
232  CFU issued a press statement rejecting the land clause without 
mentioning the presidential powers clause.  However, at grassroots level most farmers were just 
as concerned about the governance clauses as they were by the compulsory acquisition clause.  
The ICG (2004: 69) noted that: 
 
the official constitutional commission was ultimately reduced to something of a farce. 
After the 400 person commission had deliberated for months, the drafting committee of 
senior ZANU PF officials rushed a version to Mugabe that omitted many of the key 
clauses at the last minute, including one calling for Mugabe to resign by April 2000. 
 
The controversial clauses of the proposed constitution threatened to disenfranchise farmers, 
whilst the NCA and the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) provided an 
alternative.  Most farmers, across their divisions were highly cynical about the motives of these 
two clauses, adding to their concerns about the economic crisis, and mounting corruption.
233   
Whilst the NCA mobilised effectively in urban areas, farmers began to mobilize through local 
exercises, by urging farm-workers to reject the constitution, and by printing t-shirts and leaflets 
calling for a ‘NO’ vote.
234 This unprecedented opposition from an unlikely array of groups 
amalgamated into a groundswell of anti-government sentiment. The draft constitution was 
rejected by 55 percent to 44 percent. CFU minutes note that that the result was “generally 
positive…that Mugabe had been called to resign from within the party… [and that] there are 
concerns at youth group movements”.
235  The CFU Council, along with most farmers remained 
unaware of the real political ramifications. 
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1.5  CONCLUSION 
 
Against Zimbabwe’s post-2000 upheavals it is easy to forget that the preceding period 
experienced profound changes. This paper has traced the deterioration of relations between white 
farmers and the state during the mid to late-1990s and explored the stagnation in land 
redistribution.  Rather than speeding up land transfers, the increased politicisation and 
racialisation of the land question by the ruling party became a central feature of the deadlock.  It 
isolated white farmers and donors, and the more pragmatic and consensus-seeking elements of 
the ruling party and state bureaucracy. 
 
Distinctions between the ruling party and the state became less clear during this period as 
alliances formed between an aggressive black empowerment lobby, the war veterans, and 
proponents of radical land reform within government.   The perception by this alliance that 
‘white farmers’ were resisting land redistribution brought an impatience and intolerance to the 
negotiations, which overwhelmed the diminishing influence and cohesion of ‘moderate’ groups. 
Although diplomatic government front men remained at the negotiating table, the real debate 
was taking place within the confines of the politburo.    Government’s continued straddling of 
several positions on land evolved into an erratic and exclusionary approach to the reform agenda. 
Questions of land were absorbed into the confines of the party and the politburo, excluding 
farmers and donors alike.  This prompted defensive farmer stances and donor reluctance and 
became a compounding process that fed on itself.  Fundamental disagreements between market-
based reform and compulsory acquisition remained throughout, precluding chances of 
compromise. There was surprisingly little insight by farmers and donors into the changing nature 
of the ruling party and the state during this period.  Both the CFU and the British government 
underestimated the seriousness and significance of these political reconfigurations, and both 
groups overestimated their own influence over the agenda. 
 
The exclusion of farmers from policy-making was evident in other areas such as agricultural 
levies. From being heavily subsidised during the 1980s, commercial farming was increasingly 
taxed.   The isolation of farmers, within this environment of uncertainty, affected attempts to 
implement their own coherent strategies, as well as defend their interests.   Their strategies were 
increasingly reactive and disunited. Farmers’ land initiatives such as the FDT were insignificant 
and not a substitute for land reform.   Deteriorating communications and political and social 
pressures induced splits within the farming institutions, between the ZTA and the CFU, and 
within the CFU. Institutional leaders and structures struggled to retain unity and loyalty against QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS144  Page 41 
these planes of division, particularly as the profile of the commercial farming structure had 
become dramatically differentiated through vertical integration and export-oriented land uses. 
 
Ultimately, the mounting political and economic crises and the controversial clauses of the 
government’s draft constitution became a focus of opposition unity among farmers and other 
sectors of Zimbabwean society.  As in previous eras, farmer divisions were overwhelmed by 
such core issues.  Deteriorating macro-economic governance, increasing authoritarianism, and 
mounting corruption became focal points for criticism of the Mugabe regime.  By 2000 the 
majority of farmers either openly or quietly used the constitutional referendum to call for 
political change. Much of the organizational and financial clout of white farmers was turned 
actively against the ruling party at local level. For ZANU PF, ‘white farmers’ had evolved from 
a convenient ally into a real political threat. 
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